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Enforcing Desegregation: A Case Study of Federal District Court Power and 
Social Change in Macon County Alabama 
Brian K. Landsberg  
ABSTRACT 
 This case study of Lee v. Macon County Board of Education demonstrates 
that a federal district court in Alabama, enforcing Brown v. Board of Education, 
brought about significant social change despite constraints on the courts.  The 
court’s application of Brown played a decisive role in ending the racial caste 
system in this Alabama black belt county.  The court, by adding the United States 
Department of Justice as a party, overcame constraints that had precluded the 
executive branch from pursuing school desegregation.  Change came through the 
courts before Congress legislated against school segregation.  Seekers of social 
change must evaluate the constraints on the courts relative to the constraints on 
the other branches and levels of government. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 This article closely examines Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, a 
case that grew from a challenge to school segregation in a small Alabama county 
and became the vehicle for statewide school desegregation.  In its examination, 
the article, following the suggestion of Schultz & Gottlieb (1996: 90), deviates 
from the methodology used by Rosenberg and examines the role of the judiciary 
in school desegregation at the micro level.  It explores the question whether and 
how lower court enforcement of a Supreme Court decision such as Brown v. 
Board of Education may bring about social change even though, “in a government 
in which [powers] are separated from each other, the judiciary… will always be 
the least dangerous….” (Hamilton 1788).  To what extent are the courts 
constrained by “the inability to develop appropriate policies and … lack of 
powers of implementation?” (Rosenberg 2008:10). 
 Rosenberg lists three constraints on the ability of courts to produce 
meaningful social change: the limited nature of constitutional rights, the lack of 
judicial independence, and the judiciary’s lack of powers of implementation.  The 
second constraint, he says, can be overcome only with support from Congress and 
the executive, and the third only with support from some citizens or low levels of 
opposition from all citizens.  (Rosenberg, 35-36)  Yet Lee v. Macon County 
Board of Education produced meaningful social change despite the lack of 
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support from Congress and a high level of opposition from whites in Macon 
County. 
 To those who seek instruments of social change, the question, “Can courts 
bring about social change?” is the wrong question.   As McCann (1994:136) 
demonstrates, social change depends upon the confluence of several forces. 
Opponents of the racial caste system engaged in a multi-pronged attack in which 
the courts were an essential element.  Litigation, pressure on the executive branch, 
lobbying Congress for legislation, marches, boycotts, sit-ins, Freedom Rides, and 
voter registration campaigns were the tools. The courts enabled many of these 
methods, even encouraging some of them, and they began enforcing Brown 
before Congress’ landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 empowered federal agencies 
to enforce school desegregation.  John Doar succinctly summarized: “Look, if 
you’re going to bring about a big cultural change in this country, you need the 
three branches of the federal government to work together…” (Landsberg 
2013:304; see also, Cummings (2013:185), McCann (1992:728), and Epstein & 
Walker (2007:123)). 
 Examining litigation for social change through the lens of Lee v. Macon in 
its early phases reveals the complex interaction of the district court, the 
proponents of social change, the state and local governments, the federal 
executive branch, and the Congress.  This article covers the first two years of the 
case, 1963-1965.  By 1966 the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
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reinforced the judicial enforcement of Brown.  But implementation of Brown in 
Alabama began when Congress had done nothing either to implement or interfere 
with the Brown decision.   
 This article examines the difficult question of causation:  Did Brown bring 
about social change, or would the schools of the South, as Klarman seems to 
suggest, have desegregated faster if the Court had not decided Brown?  It also 
examines whether the original objectives of the proponents of social change were 
met by the litigation.  Any number of cases could serve as the vehicle for an 
empirical study of these questions, but Lee v. Macon County Board of Education 
provides a more comprehensive set of issues than some.  It addresses state 
interference with court-ordered desegregation, tuition grant statutes and their 
constitutionality, and the United States as a litigating amicus curiae, as well as the 
role of the state government, the Department of Justice, and the Department of 
Health Education and Welfare in bringing about desegregation (Lee v. Macon 
County Board of Education 1967). 
 Addressing the issues through this concrete case provides a perspective 
missing in Rosenberg’s analysis.  As Vecera recently demonstrated, close 
examination of specific elements may be more informative than reliance on gross 
measures such as polling.  Moreover, Rosenberg’s discussion of Brown’s 
influence on public opinion presents quantitative but not qualitative data.  He does 
not consider the extent to which Brown led opinion leaders to, as Vecera puts it, 
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adopt “a rhetoric that emphasized constitutional claims….”  (Vecera, 235)  Yet, as 
Lee v. Macon County Board of Education demonstrates, the primacy of the 
constitutional claim after Brown was decided transformed the issue from one of 
abstract social policy regarding equal education to one of enforcing the 
Constitution. 
  Lee began in 1963 as an effort by African Americans in a small rural 
county to achieve equal educational opportunity. Alabama Governor George 
Wallace’s interference with the ensuing federal court order transformed it into the 
vehicle for achieving statewide school desegregation.   This district court case 
concretizes  the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education and shows how the lower court advanced social change (Mack 
2012:1040, reviewing Brown-Nagin 2011).   The case also illuminates the role of 
the federal government in school desegregation.   
 Change began with Brown’s holding that the separate but equal doctrine in 
the public schools is unconstitutional.  However, articulation of a new legal norm 
does not necessarily change behavior.  One may expect resistance, especially 
where the legal norm differs from the social or religious norm.  As Hall (15-18) 
points out, the courts’ ability to bring about change is relatively high when they 
need not rely on other political actors to implement their decisions; school 
desegregation, however, could be achieved only through elected school boards 
carrying out the Brown mandate.  Given the political resistance to Brown in the 
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Deep South, how could the courts ensure compliance? Macon County’s 
experience shows that private plaintiffs, determined to secure equal education 
under Brown, were able to gain relief from a skilled federal judge, who enlisted 
the willing aid of the U.S. Attorney General at a time when help from Congress 
was but a dim hope and the Alabama state government was an implacable foe.  
 This study accepts Rosenberg’s model of constrained and dynamic court, 
but suggests that it is not sufficient to examine the question at the macro level, as 
Rosenberg does, but that deeper understanding comes from adding analysis at the 
micro level.  Rather than relying on regional and national desegregation statistics, 
review of news coverage, and polling data, the study examines experience in one 
school system.  It considers the tools available to the seekers of social change in 
Macon County and explains how they were deployed and how the trial court 
expanded those tools.  This method of analysis helps put the national statistics and 
polling data into perspective. 
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MACON COUNTY, THE SCHOOL BOARD, AND AFRICAN 
AMERICANS 
  The Birmingham News once characterized Macon County as the “guinea 
pig of race relations in Alabama” (Taylor 1951).  The County, located in 
Alabama’s midsection, would have been an ordinary rural Black Belt county but 
for the African American community of middle-class professionals centered 
around the Tuskegee Institute and the Tuskegee Veterans Hospital.  Black Macon 
Countians’ interest in equal education began before Brown v. Board of Education.  
In 1934 Charles Johnson, a noted African American sociologist, had written about 
the county: “It has been impossible to escape the force of tradition, as represented 
in the customs established under the institution of slavery, and adhered to by the 
white population in their relation to the Negroes, and by the Negroes in relation to 
themselves” (Johnson 1934:208).  By the 1930’s, though, even rural Macon 
County African Americans were beginning to stress the value of education 
(Johnson 1934:134, 156).   
  Before Brown, Macon County African Americans faced the long-standing 
Alabama law requiring segregation of the races, “firmly entrenched in American 
constitutional law.”  (Legislative Reference Service 1954).  And they faced a 
voter registration law that allowed systematic discrimination against African 
American applicants to vote; a hostile white political ruling class; and limited 
options for redress.  State courts were “places in which the Negro could count on 
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little consideration…”  (Cash 1941:412).  The education system for African 
Americans was based on the perception of the ruling whites that “Negro education 
… will enable us to make sure that he acquires no dangerous notions, to control 
what he is taught, to make sure that he is educated to fit into, and to stay in, his 
place” (Cash 1941:181-83).  Absent Brown, the South was highly unlikely to 
desegregate voluntarily, given its “all too great attachment to racial values and a 
tendency to justify cruelty and injustice in the name of those values…” (Cash 
1941:426).   
 In 1950 the leading Macon County civil rights organization, the Tuskegee 
Civic Association (TCA), published a chart showing that per pupil expenditure for 
Macon County whites was $255.02 compared with $88.07 per black student, a 
threefold disparity. Capital outlay per pupil reflected an even greater, tenfold 
disparity: $85.59 per white and $7.93 per black (Tuskegee Civic Association 
1950). The following January an African American mother asked the county 
superintendent to either provide her son at the black high school in Tuskegee a 
geometry course or allow him to take that one course at the nearby all-white 
Tuskegee High School.   Dr. C.G. Gomillion, for the TCA, then sent a petition 
that told the school board that its actions denied black children “equal protection 
of the laws secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States” (Cobb 1951; Norrell 1985:81).  
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   Although Macon County African Americans embraced the importance of 
Supreme Court decisions “trying to implement the value of equality of 
opportunity, and to rectify the unfortunate decision of the 1896 Court” (Gomillion 
1959), the first priority of the TCA was to secure the right to vote.  Not until 
Federal District Judge Frank M. Johnson had decisively acted to enforce the 
Supreme Court rulings in the TCA’s case challenging the gerrymander of 
Tuskegee and ordered relief in the Justice Department’s Macon County voting 
rights case did the TCA devote resources to school desegregation.   That the 
school desegregation suit was brought in early 1963 suggests the powerful 
influence of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Brown and the two recent voting 
rights cases.   
 Within two months of the 1955 decision in Brown II, thirty-two African 
American parents petitioned the Macon County Board of Education asking for 
desegregation.  The State Senator from Macon County, Sam Engelhardt, 
responded, “We will have segregation in the public school of Macon County or 
we will have no schools,” and the chairman of the Board worried that the petition 
“would whip up ‘a great deal of resentment’” (“Thirty-Two Negroes Ask for 
School Desegregation in Macon County” 1955).  In 1955, the TCA sent telegrams 
to Governor Folsom protesting state legislation to prevent Brown v. Board of 
Education from going into effect and in 1956 published a letter in a local 
newspaper asking the school board to consider desegregation, and other appeals 
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followed (Guzman 1984:150-51).  This made inevitable a conflict between the 
federal court’s duty under the Constitution to enforce Brown and the state 
government led by the Alabama governor arguing states’ rights. 
  White resistance to desegregation ran high throughout Alabama, 
especially in the Black Belt, where white students were both heavily outnumbered 
and tended to receive highly favored access to educational resources. Senator 
Engelhardt had successfully laid the foundation for state support for an all-white 
private school where parents could send their children if and when the inevitable 
desegregation finally took place.  As Governor Patterson took office in 1959, the 
TCA became concerned about threats of Ku Klux Klan violence if the schools 
were desegregated (Buford 1959).  As Peltason (1961:58) noted in the time 
period, “Segregationists know that if they can keep Negroes from suing in federal 
courts they can continue to operate segregated institutions.  They have not 
hesitated therefore to intimidate Negro plaintiffs.”  
 
THE DESEGREGATION CASE AND THE UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
 One major constraint on the courts is that they act only in response to 
litigation.  Until a case is filed, the court is powerless.  In 1963, any suit to 
desegregate would have to come from private plaintiffs, not the United States 
government.  Had the United States brought a criminal prosecution for willful 
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violation of constitutional rights a predominantly white Alabama jury, would not 
have convicted (Carr 1947:138-146).  Congress had refused to authorize the U.S. 
Attorney General to bring civil suits to remedy denials of constitutional rights 
(Peltason 1961:54-55).  Moreover, an Alabama federal court rejected the Attorney 
General’s attempt to sue on behalf of the children of the federal employees at the 
V.A. hospital (U.S. v. Madison County Board of Education 1963).  John Doar 
later explained: “We didn’t have any jurisdiction to bring school cases at that 
time, and we only entered school cases as friends of the court, or if there was a 
violation of a federal court order” (Eyes on the Prize 1985). 
 It fell to the African American parents to undertake the litigation.  In 
September 1962 the TCA petitioned the Macon County School Board to develop 
a desegregation plan.  The School Board did not respond (Tuskegee Civic 
Association 1965). In early January 1963 the Association hired Fred Gray, who 
filed suit on January 28, 1963, representing parents of sixteen school age children 
from eight Tuskegee families.  The suit was assigned to the only judge in the 
federal district court in Montgomery, Frank M. Johnson.  Judge Johnson had 
already heard two voting rights cases involving Macon County and so was 
familiar with the operation of the racial caste system there (Bass 1993:209).  
Johnson, a former United States Attorney, had developed respect for the Civil 
Rights Division of the Department of Justice, and within days of the filing he 
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notified the Division that he planned to ask the United States to participate as 
amicus curiae with the rights of a party (Marshall 1963).   
  That district courts may summon the help of a litigating amicus suggests 
that the institutional weaknesses of the “constrained court” can be overcome by a 
determined and imaginative judge, even in a case raising “unpopular lateral 
issues,” where implementation of court orders depends on cooperation from 
officials outside the court system (Rosenberg 2008:10; Hall 2011:17,127).  True, 
the government may always decline the invitation to participate, but precedent 
and the normal commitment of the executive to maintain law and order generally 
lead the government to participate as requested (Brownell 1956).  
 Although the defendants filed a perfunctory motion asking the court to 
dismiss the Macon County desegregation case, the law was clear and the facts of 
segregation indisputable.  When the suit was filed in 1963, no school in the state 
enrolled white and black students.   Most Alabama whites were dead set against 
desegregation.  The new Governor, George C. Wallace, had declared at his 
inauguration in January of 1963, “I draw the line in the dust and toss the gauntlet 
before the feet of tyranny and I say segregation now, segregation tomorrow, 
segregation forever.”  He gave assurance that he would fight the federal 
government and the federal courts:  “That from this day, from this hour . . . from 
this minute . . . we give the word of a race of honor that we will tolerate their boot 
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in our face no longer . . . . and let those certain judges put that in their opium 
pipes of power and smoke it for what it is worth” (Wallace 1963a). 
 As the fall semester drew nearer, events unfolded at an increasingly 
intense pace.  The actors included the plaintiffs, the school board, the United 
States through its lawyers, the Macon Countians who wanted to fight 
desegregation, the Governor, and Judge Johnson.   
  In July 1963, the plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate relief.  A few days 
later the court of appeals ordered immediate relief in separate school 
desegregation cases in Birmingham and Mobile. Thus, the court in Lee v. Macon 
knew both that it was required to act and that Governor Wallace was likely to 
interfere. So the following week, Judge Johnson not only joined the U.S. as a 
friend of the court, but took the important additional step of appointing the United 
States as a party.  He justified this unusual order by stating “that the public 
interest in the administration of justice and in preserving law and order  and in 
protecting the authority and integrity of the lawfully constituted courts of the 
United States made it appropriate and necessary that the United States of America 
be designated to appear and participate as a party ” (Lee v. Macon County Board 
of Education 1964:744-745).  This formulation altered Judge Wright’s language 
in bringing the United States into the New Orleans case: “in order to maintain and 
preserve the due administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial 
processes of the United States” (Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board 1961:876).   
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The addition of the words “law and order” transformed the role of the United 
States from protector of court orders to protector of law itself, which in the 
context of school desegregation cases meant protector of constitutional rights, the 
very role that Congress had twice denied the Department of Justice.   
 At a hearing on August 13, 1963, the evidence showed that the school 
district continued to maintain a racially-segregated school system.  However, 
unlike most other deep south school districts, the defendants offered to prepare a 
desegregation plan by December 1963 and were “at the present time ready and 
willing to start immediately in the desegregation of the schools of Macon County, 
Alabama, … [under] the Alabama School Placement Law, without any racial 
discrimination” (Lee v. Macon County Board of Education 1963:300).  The court 
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, enjoining segregation of the schools, requiring 
non-racial assignments under the pupil placement law, and requiring a plan for 
desegregation to be filed by December.  At the request of David Norman, an 
attorney for the United States, the court ordered the defendants to report to the 
court on their actions on applications for assignment under the pupil placement 
law (Lee v. Macon County Board of Education 1963, Tentative Findings and 
Conclusions Aug. 27).  The reporting requirement would help the court and the 
parties to ensure compliance.  This was an early sign that the court, with the 
backing of the Attorney General, would vigorously enforce its orders. 
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 After the hearing, the parties and Judge Johnson privately discussed next 
steps. They agreed that the initial black student applications would be only to 
attend Tuskegee High School, because “everyone agreed that the Notasulga and 
Shorter areas [where the other white schools were located] are bad areas and that 
integration would undoubtedly go smoother in the Tuskegee school.”  Judge 
Johnson then met privately with Norman, and told him that Governor Wallace 
was likely to interfere with desegregation at one of the four school districts that 
were to desegregate that fall and that the Justice Department needed to “keep our 
intelligence forces going so that we will be really ready if there is any trouble.”  
He also wanted the Justice Department to stay in close contact with the Macon 
County superintendent, to help him resist pressure to violate the order (Norman 
1963).    
 After Judge Johnson entered the desegregation order, John Doar, second in 
command of the Civil Rights Division, wrote a memorandum that reflected an 
increasingly proactive role of the United States.  He proposed to return to 
Tuskegee the next morning “to go over the list of applicants to determine that the 
Board has been fair with respect to acceptance and rejection.”  He acknowledged 
that “this puts the Department of Justice deep into the supervision of the school 
system prior to any objections by the Negroes,” and he noted that this “takes the 
burden of policing the school board off the back of the Negroes’ attorney.”  
Another reason for taking on this role was “This is what Judge Johnson wants.”  
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He deemed the deep involvement of the Department of Justice as necessary, 
because the plaintiffs, court, and school board “face tremendous problems in 
working out a satisfactory school system in Macon County (5 Negro school 
children for every one white child).”  Finally, Doar argued, “The experience that 
we gain here will be useful in counseling with the Board and the Court on a 
feasible school desegregation plan” (Doar 1963).   
 This memo reflects optimism, hard-nosed analysis of the situation, and a 
view that Department of Justice participation in this case must go beyond 
enforcing court orders and must reach into shaping the relief in the case.  The rest 
of the memorandum, devoted to security issues and community relations, showed 
that Doar was creating close relationships with both the black and white 
leadership, including local law enforcement.  The Department of Justice was now 
acting more like a party than an amicus. 
 Twenty-seven African Americans applied to attend white schools, the 
Tuskegee News reported.  The story noted that observers believed the pupil 
placement law could not be used to maintain segregation (Tuskegee News 1963).  
The school board, after consulting with the Tuskegee mayor and some city 
council members, unanimously voted to comply with the order.  The day after the 
March on Washington, the Board approved the enrollment of thirteen of the forty-
eight African American students who had by then applied to attend Tuskegee 
High School, where 550 white students were enrolled.  The Superintendent of 
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Schools, C.A. Pruitt, did “not anticipate any trouble,” and, he added, local police 
could take care of any problems that might occur (Harris 1963).   
 After the school board selected the thirteen African American students to 
attend Tuskegee High School, the students met regularly with attorney Fred Gray 
and community leaders to prepare themselves for integration.  They were aware 
of what had happened in Little Rock six years earlier, and the grownups at the 
meeting “would tell us things like you can expect to be hollered at, you can expect 
to maybe even be spit upon.  But you are to take no action.”  Then, as Willie 
Wyatt recounts, John Doar introduced himself and explained “that the Justice 
Department is there for our benefit, to look out for us, for our security.”   
Wyatt was impressed that the federal government was taking an interest in  
 
the case and him as an individual (Bagley 2012). 
 
 The Department of Justice thus viewed its role in the case as extending 
well beyond the giving of advice or presenting evidence in court.  While the 
students were not in an attorney-client relationship with the Department of 
Justice, its lawyers took on a responsibility to insure that the students’ rights were 
protected. 
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THE STATE’S ROLE 
  The Governor had promised “segregation forever.”  His predecessor, John  
Patterson, had successfully followed a strategy of delay, but that strategy had 
begun to run its course.  Not only had Judge Johnson ordered desegregation of the 
Macon County schools, but judges in the other two judicial districts had ordered a 
start to desegregation in Birmingham, Huntsville and Mobile.  Thirteen African 
American children were to begin classes at the formerly all-white Tuskegee High 
School, and a smaller number of African American children had been admitted to 
white schools in the three urban centers.  On the other hand, segregation still 
reigned supreme in over 100 school districts in Alabama.  Patterson’s strategy of 
leaving school segregation as a local matter might at least have preserved 
segregation in those other districts a while longer (Howard 2008:99-100; Walker 
2009:156).  Wallace, however, had achieved national notoriety and approval of 
most Alabama whites when he had stood in the school house door at the 
University of Alabama, and once again he chose to take the politically popular 
route, this time using force to keep black children out of white schools.    
 On September 2, 1963, Governor Wallace first issued an executive order 
requiring Macon County to delay the opening of Tuskegee High School for a 
week.  This order was based on “conditions calculated to result in a disruption of 
the peace and tranquility of this State … resulting from the threat of forced and 
19 
 
unwarranted integration…” (Wallace 1963b).   The school superintendent 
announced that school would open as scheduled, but the Governor then ordered 
his State Highway Patrol and members of the Dallas County Sheriff’s Posse to 
surround Tuskegee High School and prevent students from entering.  Although 
there were some calls for court action against the Governor, no party filed any 
papers at this point.  The delay was only for a week, and the closing affected 
students of both races, so the interference with desegregation was minimal. 
However, another development would gravely endanger desegregation: a group of 
white parents set about to organize a white private school in Macon County, with 
full support from Governor Wallace and the promise of tuition grants from the 
state (Wallace 1963b). 
 After the one week delay, Governor Wallace issued three executive orders 
stating that no child shall be permitted to integrate the schools in Macon County, 
Birmingham, and Mobile.  Unaware of the orders, the black students who had 
been admitted to Tuskegee High School met once again at the office of school 
superintendent Pruitt, who was “as cordial as he could be.”   A black driver then 
drove them in a school bus to the school, where they were met by State Troopers.  
One Trooper boarded the bus, read the Governor’s proclamation to the students 
and gave each a copy (Bagley 2012).  At Tuskegee High School, Department of 
Justice attorney John Martin observed white children enter the school and saw the 
bus carrying African American children drive away after state troopers boarded it.  
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He reported that there were no hostile crowds around the school, just newsmen 
(Martin 1963). 
 This was no longer just a school desegregation case.  Suddenly, like the 
Little Rock case before it, it had escalated into a law enforcement issue.  Could a 
Governor interfere with the efforts of these three school boards to comply with a 
federal court order?  In response, the United States filed a new suit against 
Governor Wallace, state law enforcement officials, and the State of Alabama, to 
enjoin the interference in the three school systems.  The United States sued “in its 
sovereign capacity to safeguard the due administration of justice in its court and 
the integrity of its judicial process.”   Burke Marshall called the judges who had 
issued the Birmingham and Mobile orders, and, in an unprecedented move, 
although the case had been filed in Judge Johnson’s judicial district, all the federal 
district judges from all three judicial districts in Alabama sat as a “five judge 
district court” (Bass 1993:209).  Judge Johnson explained this demonstration of 
judicial creativity: “I presided in their presence and dictated the opinion, and they 
all signed it and went back home.  There’s no statutory basis or any other legal 
basis of which I’m aware that authorizes a five-judge District Court.”  The 
solidarity of the five judges strongly displayed judicial determination to enforce 
Brown.  The court in the Wallace case recognized the interest of the United States, 
ruling: 
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[The United States] is suffering and, unless an injunction is 
entered, will continue to suffer immediate and irreparable injury as 
a consequence of the impairment of its judicial process, the 
obstruction of the due administration of justice in its courts, and 
the deprivation of rights under the Constitution and laws of the 
United States (U.S. v. Wallace 1963). 
 
Wallace’s lawyer, John Kohn, lacking stronger arguments, argued 
that the Fourteenth Amendment, “conceived in hate, born in the aftermath 
of war, and carried through at the point of the bayonet,” was not valid 
(Bass 1993:211) and an injunction was in any event not necessary. 
 The court enjoined the Governor and his subordinates from interfering 
with school desegregation that had been ordered for that fall, and it ordered that 
they maintain law and order so that desegregation could move forward.  The order 
more generally enjoined them from “[p]reventing, attempting to prevent, or 
interfering with the exercise of rights or the performance of duties under” the 
school desegregation orders of the three United States District Courts in Macon 
County, Mobile, and Birmingham (U.S. v. Wallace 1963).  This order became the 
first step toward the eventual statewide injunction that would come four years 
later.  More immediately, this time there was no stand in the schoolhouse door, 
and the black students began attending Tuskegee High School. 
ANALYSIS OF THE 1963 EVENTS 
 This first phase reflects the complexity of the question of Brown’s impact 
on meeting the goals of seekers of social change.  The African Americans of 
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Macon County had a thirst for education, fed at least in part by the legacy of 
Booker T. Washington.  Their desire for equal education preceded Brown v. 
Board, but they viewed that decision as opening new opportunities.  They wanted 
equal educational opportunity, and they saw desegregation as a route to achieve 
that end.  In this 80% black county, face time with white children was at most a 
secondary goal.  Practically, this meant that the seekers of social change had to 
make an initial choice, whether to use their limited resources to pursue school 
desegregation or to pursue voting rights.  They lacked resources to pursue both 
simultaneously, and they chose voting rights, perhaps forced to do so by the 
Alabama legislature’s gerrymander to exclude them from the municipal 
boundaries of Tuskegee, but also because they did view the vote as the right that 
would help secure other rights.   
 Next, having secured voting rights, the TCA asked the school board to 
desegregate; when the board failed to respond, TCA devoted its limited resources 
to employ Fred Gray to bring suit.    The different actors held a variety of goals.  
The TCA’s goals were focused on equal educational opportunities.  Then Judge 
Johnson brought in the Department of Justice, which pursued at a minimum a law 
enforcement goal but perhaps also a desegregation goal.  Judge Johnson was 
guided by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Brown and subsequent cases. Once it 
was sued, the school district acquiesced in a desegregation order, perhaps 
influenced by the growing black vote or perhaps believing that compliance would 
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be the best route to holding the school system together.  Governor Wallace 
provided yet another perspective, one that was popular with most of the white 
electorate in Macon County and throughout most of Alabama: resistance.  All the 
actors were aware that the ultimate target was the racial caste system.  
MORE INTERFERENCE, PRIVATE SCHOOLS, AND TRANSITION TO 
STATEWIDE CASE 
 Having failed to halt the desegregation of the Macon County schools, 
Governor Wallace and his allies sought to undermine desegregation by creating a 
new school, private in theory but state-supported, for the white children of Macon 
County.   And State School Superintendent Austin Meadows became increasingly 
vocal in discouraging local school officials from desegregating (Lee v. Macon 
County Board of Education 1965:U.S. Brief 13).  
 The first phase had begun with emphasis on achieving token 
desegregation, without saying much about the future.  Would the Pupil Placement 
law still apply?  What grades would be covered each year?  How would the black 
schools become desegregated?  What about faculty and transportation?  Until the 
interference by the Governor and state school officials, all assumed that court- 
ordered desegregation would proceed school system-by-school system rather than 
statewide.  What in retrospect seems quite simple -- the absorption of a few more 
students into a white school -- was at the time a major, headline-grabbing issue. 
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 The thirteen black students at Tuskegee High School soon found 
themselves in all-black classes, as their white classmates of high school age  
transferred either to the other two white high schools in Macon County or to the 
newly-formed private segregation academy, the Macon Academy.  Nonetheless, 
they felt that the teachers at Tuskegee High gave them a good education.  
Governor Wallace helped raise money for the Macon Academy and also (after the 
court had enjoined the school board from doing so) transported white students 
from Tuskegee High to the other white public high schools in Shorter and 
Notasulga.  Moreover, in January 1964 the State Board of Education, in a serious 
misstep that violated the Patterson strategy of leaving school governance to the 
local school authorities, ordered that Tuskegee High be closed for lack of 
adequate enrollment and that its students (now all black) be sent to the black high 
school, Tuskegee Institute High (New York Times 1964).  
 Fred Gray, supported by the United States, asked Judge Johnson to enter a 
temporary restraining order against Governor Wallace and State Superintendent 
Austin Meadows, the two top officers of the State Board.  Gray also challenged 
the constitutionality of their actions and of the state tuition grant statute which 
would help fund segregation academies such as Macon Academy.  The court 
entered the TRO and assigned the black students to Shorter and Notasulga.   
Shorter High School desegregation occurred without incident, under guard of 
sixty Alabama state troopers.  Notasulga’s desegregation met with initial 
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resistance from the town’s mayor until Judge Johnson enjoined him (U.S. v. Rea 
1964). 
 In 1964 Fred Gray had not just sought relief for Macon County, nor did he 
confine himself to challenging the tuition grant statute.  He relates that the 
“realization hit me like the burning bush speaking to Moses,” that if the Governor 
had the power to close a school in Macon County, “he should be compelled to use 
that same power to integrate all of the school systems in Alabama which were not 
already then under court order” (Gray 1995:213).  So Gray added the Governor 
and other state officials as defendants and asked the court for statewide relief. The 
United States supported most of Gray’s motion but took a different approach to 
statewide relief, asking only that the court “enjoin the State Board to perform its 
constitutional obligation, within the limits of its state authority, to accomplish or 
facilitate the elimination of racial discrimination from the state school system.”  
However, the United States expressed no view on the extent of the Board’s 
authority -- a partial departure from the private plaintiffs’ position (Barrett 1964).  
Alabama Attorney General Richmond Flowers argued that the Macon County 
Board had complied with the court’s orders and that the plaintiffs had no right to 
expand the case beyond Macon County (Flowers 1964:Motion). 
 After a February 1964 hearing on Gray’s motion, the Department had filed 
a lengthy brief  urging entry of a preliminary injunction running against both the 
Macon County officials and the defendant Alabama officials; asking that the 
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grants-in-aid statute be declared unconstitutional as applied to grants for students 
at racially segregated schools, that the state officials be enjoined from interfering 
with desegregation in school systems in Alabama and be ordered to take 
affirmative steps to eliminate the dual school system in Alabama, “based not only 
upon the assumption and usurpation of authority by these officials but also upon 
the legal authority that they presently possess under Alabama law;” and that the 
Alabama Pupil Placement Law be declared unconstitutional “until the dual system 
of schools in Alabama is eliminated.”  The brief described the evidence of the 
state’s official policy of segregation, which created its dual system; the general 
control and supervision of the state superintendent and board over the local school 
systems and over the administration of the pupil placement act; their threat to pay 
tuition grants to students at Macon Academy and their active support of the 
Academy; and their interference with the federal court orders (U.S. Department of 
Justice 1964).  The United States, in filing this brief, was inching closer to the 
plaintiffs’ position. 
 Because the case now challenged the constitutionality of a state law (the 
tuition grant statute), federal law at the time required that a three-judge district 
court be convened.  Montgomery-based Judge Richard Rives of the Fifth Circuit 
and District Judge Hobart Grooms of the Northern District of Alabama, based in 
Birmingham were appointed to serve on the court with Judge Johnson.  In July 
1964 the three-judge court cautiously laid the foundation for sweeping statewide 
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relief if the Governor continued on the course he had set, of interference with 
school desegregation.  The court readily agreed that the Governor and State Board 
of Education had repeatedly interfered with the good faith efforts of the Macon 
County School Board to comply with the desegregation orders.   
 The court enjoined the State Board and Wallace (in his capacity as 
President ex officio of the State Board and not as Governor) from interfering with 
desegregation of Macon County schools.  This seems to have been a symbolic 
show of deference to the office of Governor and also a warning shot that if 
Wallace persisted in his actions, the injunction would also run against him as 
Governor.  The court also held that the state tuition grant law could not be used to 
finance the Macon Academy but it did not declare the statute unconstitutional in 
all circumstances.  Plaintiffs had also challenged Alabama’s pupil placement law 
as unconstitutional.  While agreeing that the school authorities had applied the 
law in a discriminatory manner in Macon County, the court declined to hold it 
unconstitutional “at this time,” instead enjoining discrimination in the application 
of the law (Lee v. Macon County Board of Education 1964:756) 
 The novel and most consequential question before the court was whether 
to grant the plaintiffs’ plea that it “order desegregation of all the public schools of 
the State of Alabama at the elementary and secondary level based upon the 
assumption or usurpation of authority by the Governor, the State Superintendent 
of Education and the State Board of Education….”  The Governor argued that the 
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local plaintiffs had no viable claim with respect to school systems outside Macon 
County.  Here, the order making the United States not only amicus curiae but also 
a party became crucial.  The court said that the United States was pursuing “the 
public interest in the due administration of justice in the Federal courts.”  
Therefore, “the contention of the defendants that relief must be restricted only to 
these Negro plaintiffs borders on the frivolous.”  Although it found that the State 
defendants’ actions “place them in an extremely weak position,” the court 
declined to enter the statewide desegregation order, saying instead: 
For the present time this Court will proceed upon the assumption 
that the Governor, the State Superintendent of Education, and the 
State Board of Education will comply in good faith with the 
injunction of this Court prohibiting such interference with the local 
city and county school boards, and through the exercise of 
considerable judicial restraint, no statewide desegregation order 
will be ordered at this time.  (Lee v. Macon 1964:756). 
 
 The court thus simultaneously showed restraint and deference to the State 
officials while also enjoining them from interfering with school desegregation 
anywhere in the State (Lee v. Macon 1964).   To underscore that it would be 
holding the State officials’ feet to the fire, the court also required that they use 
whatever control and supervision they exercised over local school districts “in 
such a manner as to promote and encourage the elimination of racial 
discrimination in the public schools…” (Lee v. Macon 1964:July 13 decree). 
 The opinion was squarely grounded on Brown, on three Supreme Court 
cases that had just been decided in May and June implementing Brown, and on six 
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recent Fifth Circuit cases enforcing Brown.  The court announced its ruling eleven 
days after the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but no evidence 
points to any linkage between the two, and the court did not mention the Act in its 
opinion (Lee v. Macon 1964).  The court had already issued a temporary 
restraining order in February and held a hearing in April, when the outcome of the 
legislation was still in doubt.  The legislation, of which the judges obviously were 
aware, added nothing of immediate relevance to the issues before the court.  In 
short, the orders against the state defendants, which in time would lead to state-
wide school desegregation, flowed from Brown, not from the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. 
 School openings in Alabama, both in 1964 and 1965, occurred without 
major incidents and with slight increases in desegregation.  By 1965 32 African 
Americans were attending formerly all-white schools and eight whites were 
attending formerly all-black schools in Macon County (Lee v. Macon 1967:U.S. 
Brief Appendix C, Table VI).  Statewide, slightly over 1,000 African American 
students in Alabama (0.34% of Alabama’s black students) attended formerly all-
white schools in 1965.  Though one could rightly say this was a small and slow 
start, the courts had, with no help from Congress, broken the dikes guarding 
segregation of the schools.  The orders of 1963 and 1964 would soon give rise to 
a flood of desegregation. 
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 1965 was a year of transition, when the federal government began large 
scale enforcement of provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 relating to school 
desegregation.  Some Alabama school systems showed a willingness to comply, 
but Governor Wallace and State Superintendent Meadows aggressively interfered 
with all such efforts.  This led both the private plaintiffs in Lee v. Macon and the 
United States to seek statewide relief, which the court eventually granted in 1967.   
That part of the story must await another day.   
THE DISTRICT COURT AS AN AGENT OF SOCIAL CHANGE 
 The story of Lee v. Macon shows that seekers of social change may 
achieve it through court action.  The change may take longer than wished.  It may 
not take the precise shape envisioned at the outset.  Constraints on the courts do 
mean that they cannot create social change by themselves.  And the norms that the 
Supreme Court establishes can profoundly affect the course of events.  Even a 
reluctant executive branch may find itself enforcing the court’s decrees, not 
because it agrees with them but because it recognizes the rule of law.   Judge 
Johnson, building on what other judges had done in the Eisenhower 
administration, was able to marshal assistance from the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations in Lee v. Macon by making the United States a party and amicus. 
 Social change is particularly difficult when prior court decisions have 
validated deeply embedded social practices in society and have created structural 
as well as cultural impediments to change.  Southern whites knew that 
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dismantling the dual school systems would upset the racial caste system.  That 
system had ensured white dominance in education, in employment, in politics, 
and in social and economic affairs.  As Judge Frank Easterbrook explained an 
analogous cultural phenomenon:   
People taught from birth that black people are fit only for slavery 
rarely rebelled against that creed; beliefs coupled with the self-
interest of the masters established a social structure that inflicted 
great harm while enduring for centuries (American Booksellers v. 
Hudnut 1985:329). 
 
 So the white South saw Brown as an attack on a way of life, just as an 
earlier generation had viewed emancipation.  African Americans saw it in much 
the same way.  Although heavily black school systems would have few, if any, 
whites to provide an integrated education, black parents knew that desegregation 
could mean that their children could attend the closest school, study from the 
newer text books, ride on the good buses, have integrated faculty, compete in 
integrated athletic leagues, and advance to integrated universities, as Anthony Lee 
and Willie Wyatt did after graduation.  The experience in Macon County fills out 
the picture found in the nationwide and regional statistics reflecting the extent of 
desegregation over time, that inform many studies of the impact of Brown 
(Rosenberg 2008:50-51; Klarman 2004:363).1 
                                                          
1 This case study also informs the broader separation of powers consideration of the Supreme 
Court’s ability to advance social change considered chiefly through statistical analysis of the 
influences on the court (e.g. Dahl 1957; Segal 1997; Epstein et al. 2001; Owens 2010). 
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 One should discount the courts as agents of social change if the evidence 
shows that the change would have taken place with or without judicial 
intervention or if one could show that change did not take place.  So long as 
Plessy stood as both a symbol and a precedent, it was extremely unlikely that 
either Congress or the Southern States would bring about desegregation.  This 
helps explain why neither the state nor federal governments moved to desegregate 
the schools.  Nor did any school districts sue the state to overturn the segregation 
laws.  Some northern states did pass civil rights legislation, and President Truman 
desegregated the armed forces (Kluger 1975:759; Klarman 2004:364).  But 
against those who wished for school desegregation, Plessy was repeatedly cited 
not only to support the legality of state segregation laws, but also as a 
constitutional barrier to federal action.  While Congress and the Executive need 
not have court approval to act within the scope of their authority, Congress’ 
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment would not include the power to 
require desegregation so long as Plessy stood.   
 Separation of powers doctrine applies differently to court decisions 
interpreting the Constitution and those interpreting statutes.  Congress may 
overturn the latter; it may not overturn the former, except by constitutional 
amendment or indirect means such as influencing the courts through its exercise 
of the advise-and-consent oversight of judicial nominees or adjusting the budget 
of the courts (Epstein & Walker 2007:58-60, 123-124; Harvey & Friedman 
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2009:575-576; Eskridge 1991:679-680; City of Boerne v. Flores 1997:519).  
Drawing on the Spending Power, Congress could have imposed desegregation as 
a condition to receiving federal funds.  However, it consistently rejected the 
Powell amendment, which would have forbidden race discrimination by school 
systems receiving federal funds (Rosenberg 2008:122-23).  Not until 1965 was 
federal education spending a significant stick to coerce compliance with federal 
rules (Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965).  Under Plessy the 
Southern states had created a complex arrangement of separate school systems, 
and societal reliance on the existing structure created a further barrier to change 
(Golden 1959:169-70).  In the words of President Eisenhower (1955), “the 
practice of segregating educational facilities was authorized by the law of the land 
under Supreme Court ruling, from 1896 to 1954.  Under that ruling …, customs 
were established in certain sections of our country which have been repudiated 
and declared illegal by the Supreme Court ruling of 1954.”  Plessy not only 
stamped segregation with legality but also stamped it, in the eyes of most 
Southern whites, as moral (Briggs v. Elliott 1951:537; Davis v. County School 
Board of Prince Edward County 1952:339).  Thus, the need for the Brown 
decision stemmed not just from the growing desire for social change, but also 
from the substantial barriers to social change so long as Plessy's application to 
public schools remained good law.    
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 Although Brown faced the challenges of the “constrained court,” Lee v. 
Macon provides a vivid example of those challenges being overcome without aid 
from Congress.  Lee v. Macon did not stand alone in 1963, as desegregation began 
or continued in every state except Mississippi even though it was widely believed 
that President Kennedy’s proposed Civil Rights Act had little chance of passing 
(Greenberg 1994:254-55; The Alabama Council on Human Rights, et al. 1972:1).  
The constraints on the courts did slow down judicial action, as prospective 
plaintiffs struggled to find lawyers, decisions of reluctant trial courts went through 
the appeals process, and determined defendants used every possible tool to delay.  
But in the fullness of time, the lower courts did enforce Brown and the school 
districts did comply.  A final constraint here was the culture of the white minority.  
If the objective of the plaintiffs was to end racial isolation, the flight of whites to 
private schools did defeat meeting that goal in Macon County, at least for a time. 
           Did Brown cause change?  Those who deny that it did cite the long delay 
between the Brown decision in 1954 and the desegregation of public schools in 
the Deep South (Rosenberg 2008:52) and statistics showing that many black 
students still attend virtually one race schools.  Not until after the executive 
branch and the Congress got involved did the Deep South desegregate its public 
schools.  However,  the border states did, either voluntarily or as a result of 
litigation, make significant progress in compliance during that ten-year period 
from 1955 to 1964 (2008:103-104).  While African Americans filed few 
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desegregation suits in the Deep South from 1954-1964, Brown energized the 
African American community to seek desegregation of buses, parks, libraries, 
zoos, and other public facilities (Brown-Nagin 2011:432-34).  More important, it 
became a central element in the ideology of the civil rights movement. As Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. (1964:83) said, “Thus it is that I can urge man to obey the 
1954 decision of the Supreme Court, for it is morally right; and I can urge them to 
disobey segregation ordinances, for they are morally wrong.”  
 Change did come slowly.  A court may issue a decree, but that does not 
necessarily bring about instant change.  Taking a long view, though, the 
combination of the voting decrees and the school desegregation decrees led to the 
end of the racial caste system in Macon County.  The black residents of Macon 
County had to prioritize how to use their limited resources.  Their focus on 
gaining a measure of political power resulted in the all-white school board taking 
a moderate stance on desegregation, but the school board had no control over the 
actions of state officials or of the parents of white students. Change through the 
ballot box would not become feasible until after passage of the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act. Even then black voters were in the minority in every state; their 
electoral influence in the South was scattered at best until after the 1970 decennial 
census, the first time that the Act was applied to redistricting.  Not until after the 
Voting Rights Act amendments of 1982 banned state voting laws that resulted in 
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diluting the vote based on race did racial fairness in districting become the general 
rule.   
 In the process the TCA made contact with the federal government, and the 
connections made during the voting rights case helped solidify the ability of the 
Department of Justice to help bring about school desegregation, first in planning 
for a peaceful school opening, then as a defender of the court order against 
outside interference, and ultimately as a shaper of substantive positions on such 
issues as tuition grants, the content of desegregation plans, and the contours of 
statewide relief. Judge Johnson’s bold action in designating the United States as a 
party removed one of the major constraints on judicial power. 
 Brown was a necessary, if not sufficient, prerequisite to change.  Macon 
County African Americans turned to the federal court because they had nowhere 
else to turn.  Their petitions to the school board went unanswered, as did similar 
petitions in over a dozen Alabama school districts in 1954 and 1955 (Bagley 
2013:29-31).  Even if the district wished to desegregate, it could not do so, since 
Alabama law forbidding desegregation was consistent with Plessy. A request to 
the State of Alabama for relief would have fallen on antagonistic ears.  Nor is 
there any evidence that changing attitudes might have led to change in ten, 
twenty, or thirty years after 1954.  So although compliance with Brown was slow 
in coming, it was faster than reliance on change at the state level.  Finally, change 
was unlikely to come from the other branches of the federal government, 
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constrained as they were by the Plessy decision and the political strength of the 
white “Solid South.”   
 Seekers of social change must engage in a calculus, reviewing their 
options and often being forced to choose among limited ones.  For them, the 
federal courts, however constrained they may be, have one advantage that the 
other two branches and the state governments do not have:  they are not captives 
of the prevailing majority will of the moment but instead answer to the larger 
values embedded in the Constitution. 
 It is difficult to see how change would have come to Macon County 
without federal court intervention.  Sam Engelhardt and those like him ran Macon 
County and dominated the Alabama legislature.  Civil rights activists needed 
support from the courts and the federal government, so change from within had 
little chance.  In such a situation, the natural place to turn is Congress.  Yet, 
despite demands from civil rights groups, Congress rebuffed efforts to authorize 
the Attorney General to sue for school desegregation.  Congress, neither resisting 
nor promoting desegregation, showed no leadership on this issue, because the 
Southern committee chairs and caucus in the Senate were too strong and 
unyielding on most race issues.  The backbone of segregated schools in Alabama 
was broken by Lee v. Macon and other cases in 1963, before Congress had acted. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Brown and its aftermath show the complexity of social change, especially 
when change meets strong resistance.  But this history also suggests that the 
courts often have the competence to deal with that complexity and to lead the way 
for other essential actors. Yet one should also note the negative side:  The courts 
can be not only agents of change but also agents of the status quo.  They can 
validate laws that entrench the status quo, as they did in the years after Plessy.  
And they can effectively block or at least delay performance of the other 
branches’ reform agenda.  Opponents of social change often mobilize to challenge 
it in the courts. 
 In short, if we speak of the “constrained court,” we must also speak of the 
“constrained executive” and the “constrained Congress” (Schultz & Gottlieb, 
1996:67) and we must acknowledge that those judges who are willing to enforce 
unpopular laws wield many tools of a dynamic court.  Before Brown, school 
segregation was an entrenched social custom that could be undone only through 
state legislation, a most unlikely avenue for change, in light of the entrenched 
racial caste system.  Brown transformed school segregation into an issue of 
whether the Constitution would be enforced.   Ultimately, Brown succeeded 
because it lent formal legitimacy to the opponents of school segregation, 
empowered the lower courts and the executive and put pressure on the Congress.  
Lacking authority from Congress to bring school desegregation cases, the 
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Department of Justice enforced desegregation orders once they were entered and 
gained legitimacy as a party with the rights of a plaintiff, from orders such as 
Judge Johnson’s order conferring that status.  Congress acted only after the lower 
courts had already begun the process of desegregating schools in the Deep South. 
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